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SARTRE'S. LINGUISTIC
PHENOMJ4~NOLOGY
80th in Critique de La raison diaLeetique 11, and in L 'Idiot de LafamiLLe 111,
Jean-Paul Sartre writes, "Words are stones. "I At the end of Cr;t;que 11, Sartre
suggests that this materialist ontology is part of the larger analysis of dialectical
engagement that had oceupied him in both volumes. In L 'Idiot III Sartre offers
a historieal and political analysis of the material residue of Flaubert's aets of
writing. 80th in f:ritique II and in L 'Idiot 111, to whieh I sball restriet my
analysis, Sartre proposes implieitly, and sometimes explieitly, that our power to
speak and write helps constitute and is constituted by our social selves, incamate
in the voeal or written material of the deed, against whieh individual freedom
rises anew in eaeh aet of expression.
Sartre's proposal offers a method that he employs sporadically in Critique
II and at length in L 'Idiot 111. I shall eall this method "linguistie
phenomenology," thougb Sartre did not bimself use the term, and though
Sartre's method of analysis in these two volumes differs notably in its
materialism from other phenomenologies it resembles, including Sartre's own
in L 'Etre et Le nea,nt. In the following remarks I shall first eharaeterize Sartre's
linguistie phenomt:~nology and tben give examples of its application in Critique
11 and in L 'Idiot Ill.
J. Sartre's materialist 'linguistic pheno'menology in Critique 11.
·Crilique de la raison dialeclique 11, ed. Arlette Elkaim-Sartre (paria: Gallimard, 1985), 434.
Henceforth referred to in the notes as eRD U. Critique oJDialectical Reason 11, ed. Arlette Elkaim-
Sartre, tr. Quintin Hoare (London: Verso, 1991), 426. Henceforth referred to in the noles as CDR
11. L'Idiot de la Jamille III (paris: Gallimard, 1973), 47. Henceforth referred to in the note. as
L 'Idiot 111. See also Hazel Bames, Sartre and Flaubert (Chicago: Univenity oe Chicago Press,
198), 249. This and all other translations from Sartre in the text oe the paper are mine.
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In Critique 11, near the end of the volume, Sartre writes:
v.ina. word ia • praxi. bee8USC it tend.to ercate a aroup. The word tcnda at the
..me time 10 mediate rceiprocitiea and 10 ercate Ihem. At the aame time it functioßl
a. 8 Ihird. Thu. communication ia dOM not by the word but by rcfcrence 10 the word,
at onee a. institution, a. dircet relation 10 context, and 8S serializcd lhird. The verbal
institution is lhe aerializcd lhird. . . .2
In the same passage Sartre writes that words are material, though material
as subtle and invisible as gase This material is Sartre's linguistic phenomenon.
For the Sartre of the Critique, as the passage just cited shows, uses of
language ceaselessly alternate between the speaker's .or writer's praxis-the
project or goal of speak.ing or writing-and the practico-inert-the linguistic
phenomenon produced by that praxis; for, once uttered or written. the words
resist change. As elsewhere in the Crilique, Sartre conceives the alternation
between praxis and practico-inert as an unending struggle in which group
solidarity is at best temporary, so that the relationship among speakers and
writers, too, is ambivalent. Since the alternation between praxis and practico-
inert as individual psychological comprehension of words and as a social
comprehension of words is itself a historical process, the dialectic is
irresolvable. The words themselves, left behind as residue of that process,
remain existentially ambiguous in constantly reengaging each new speaker's or
writer's decision. These are the chief characteristics of Sartre's linguistic
phenomenology.
Sartre thus conceives the use of language as a struggle between the
ambivalent speaker or writer and the ambiguous material residue-words-that
speakers or writers leave behind. Those who use language are ambivalent in that
their individual acts conflict with established historical understandings of what
words mean; and the wordsthemselves are ambiguous in that their meanings are
open to constant renegotiation.
Sartre's Iinguistic phenomenology contrasts in its materialism with the
idealistic assumption of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure that using language
to communicate implies a conunon set of beliefs, or presuppositions, and
constitutes a common community of speakers. Saussure's linguist studies
2CRD 11, 434. CDR 11, 426.
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langue, a consensus arrived at a given time-synchronically. Langue is not
studied historically, or diachronically, as are individual acts of speaking, parole,
or their products, langage.3 For Sartre, unlike Saussure, then, the materiality
of language in use destabilizes it.
Sartre's materialist linguistic phenomenology contrasts, as weil, with the
"pbenomenology of language"4' of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Por Merleau-Ponty
the use of language and other forms of communication in individual acts of
parole botb makes possible the form of phenomenological descriptionthat
Merleau-Ponty calls "phenomenology of language" and creates the possibility of
intersubjectivity: "... it is necessary to see language as an instrument for the
conquest of self by contact with others"5 and "... Other people are what
deliver me from my own ambivalence: we are both, he and I, two variables in
the same system. . . ."6 By contrast, for Sartre, as we have seen, the speaker
or writer struggles in constant ambivalence.
Sartre's materialist linguistic phenomenology also differs from the
"linguistic pbenomenology"7 of John L. Austin, for whom the use of language
both presupposes a permanent social consensus and makes possible the ordinary-
language analysis that he called "Iinguistic phenomenology": "... our common
stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and
the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many
generations. . . ."8 Austin, in striking contrast to Sartre, never questions the
3Cours de linguisli.que generale, ed. Tullio de Mauro (paris: Payot, 1980). Course in General
Linguislics, tr. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophieal Library, 1966).
411The PhenomenologyofLanguage." in Signs.tr. Riehard J. MeCleary (Evanston: Northwestem
University Press, 1964).
SConsciousnessand lhe Acquisi,;on ojLanguage, tr. Hugh J. Silvennan (Evanston: Northwestem
University Press. 1973), 63.
6/bid.. 67.
711 A Plea for Excuses," in Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Unnsonand G. J. Wamock (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961)1, 130.
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individual speaker's sincerity, or good faitb: "Believing in other persons, in
autbority and testimony, is an essential fart of the act of communicating, an act
which we all constantly perform. . .. "
Sartre's linguistic pbenomenology in Cr;l;que 11 entertains no assumptions
of consensus, whether of Saussurian langue-an entity fixed in time-or of
Merleau-Ponty's or Austin's versions of parole-individual, cbanging, uses of
language. Instead, Sartre argued with cbaracteristic ambivalence throughout bis
career both for a conflictual conception of human relationships and for an
elusive communal ethic, an ethic of "we" that he sought from War Diaries and
especially Cahiers pour une morale up to bis last interviews.
In Crilique 11, Sartre's ambivalent conception of human relationships
extends a dialectical view of language as verbal institution that bolb supports and
sabotages buman communication. In the very act of communicating, the speaker
or writer engages with others, yet at the same time uses language to preserve
serialityand inertia in others. In communicating, the speaker helps awaken the
inert in the other, so that the other may become part of the praxis of
communication; yet the words themselves also suppress reciprocity in that tbe
words, uttered or written, become a serialized and isolated third-an outsider to
discourse. Thus using words helps to conserve their forms as institutions and at
the same time to transform them, and using words both unites speakers and
isolates them from one anotber. This dialectic is unending, as we have already
seen.
So constituted dialectically, the Sartrian linguistic phenomenon, tbe
speaker's praxis, incarnates the residue ofthe institutions which each new act
of communication challenges. The spoken word is paramount; its determination,
again, material:
. . . Never could lhe wrillen word have been invenled (material objcct, fiauration on
clay or slone) if lhe spoken word had not already been wrlllen potentially). It
concerns lhe same thing: detennination of a breath through ItnJcture. and exis
(phonetic) or detennination of a slone, etc. Dut in the first cale materiality ia more
suhlte, not visible (in lhe sense in which agas is sublte....)10
9"Other Minds," Philosophical Papers, 99.
IOCRD 11, 434. CDR 11, 426.
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At times Sartre's account of the materiality of language superficially
resembles the internal analysis of deconstruction, as in Sartre's suggesting that
poetry is an
...attempt to play on the materiality of the word.... In brief~ to make use of the
relationship between words in order that eaeh of them seems, in that it is inert, 10
make the negati~'e synthesis of its senses.... 11
But Sartre's conception of the linguistic phenomenon and the speaker's or
writer's use of it in Critique II and L 'Idiot III is of a praxis and institution
constantly evolving historically and constantly contested rather than fixed in
time, idealized, dependent on consensus or sincerity, or determined by internal
structure alone
11. An example of Sartrian linguistic phenomenology from Critique 11: The
word as concrete relation to context.
Sartre conceives the speaker's ambivalence, or multiplicity of intentions,
as a linguistic phenomenon-an existential ambiguity made material, as we have
just seen. This view is not central to his argument in either volume of the
Crilique, but it appears in scattered, striking passages, usuallyas an aside. For
example, his editor, Arlette Elkaim Sartre, suggests in a note in her glossary
untranslated in the English edition of Cr;lique 11:
For the author of the Critique de Ja raison diaJectique, the philosophie notion
(eontrary to the seientifie eoneept whieh does not eome back to man) retains a eertain
ambiguity beeause it is understood in interiority: "What servea (philoaophy] ia that
these words are not entirely defined ... there ia in the ambiguity of the philosophieal
word 80mething whieh ooe ean make use of to go fuJ1her.t 2
Sartre is weil known for his conception of an embattled subjectivity,
seeking others only to fall to their dominance, dominate them, and separate
12CRD 11, 4590. The citation is from Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations IX, "L'6erivain et sa langue"
(Paris: GaHimard ~ 1965).
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again. This eoneeption, famous from L 'etre et le neant, made social in Critique
I, recurs in Critique 11. Embattled subjectivity is incamate and thus material in
Sartre's very uses of the term "other" or "autre," eited in the editor's glossary
with the following comment:
OTHER (capitalized): even though he did not do 10 with great rilor throulhout Ihe
manuacript, the author acema to have wanted to live thil word a capiaalleuer each
time Ibat, the pronoun rcprcaentin. or adjective qualifyin. a penon, he inailtl on
radical alterity: Ibe olber, in Ibat he .overnl or il capabio of .ovemin.latenlly (or
being lovemed by) each person'. activity. We have .y.tematized Ibil intention, in
excluding the adjective au're when it carriealbe ..me Knae but doel nOl qualify a
person: it i. in leneral in italic.; itl place IOmelimea lufficel 10 underline it.
aignification in Ihe context (libel1y olher il olber libel1y).13 .
This distinetion between Sartre's uses of 'autre', which may either refer
directly or qualify a subject, exemplifies bis conception of praxis as a constant
negotiation between the actor, other agents, and the practico-inert. I want to
consider two examples from Cr;tique 11. In the first, Sartre capitalizes "Otber"
and uses the capitalized term to cbaracterize that Other as external. In the
secood example, Sartre does not capitalize "other" and uses the term to
charaeterize an other incorporated in individual aels. For Sartre in Critique 11,
these altematives exemplify his view that human relationships are doomed to
irresolvable contradiction in whieh they either solidify into bureaueraeies or
disintegrate OBee again ioto isolation.
A. Other as Beäug, or subject: 'Autre' as nominalized pronoun.
In a passage entitled "The three factors of unity· Sartre describes the
creation of Soviet Russia under Stalin. This description can also be read more
generally as praxis imposed by an externa) Other, then integrated into everyooe
else's perception of that Other, who dominates. The unity of praxis is material
production. This unity of praxis is, of course, coercive, operating according to
a formal principle of reciprocity greatly modified, in the case of Stalin, by
material circumstances and by subsequent revisionist accounts of these
circumstances. The coereive unity of praxis is incarnate or material in specific
13CRD 11, 459. CDR 11, 458, ia shortened and misleading.
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cases. such as that of the creation of Soviet Russia under Stalin, so that the
Other-here Stalin-just is incamate Being.
Sartre's very use of the capitalized "Otber" or ..Autre," as explained in tbe
first part of the note from tbe glossary cited above, exemplifies his argument.
Thus, in Stalin's ,creation of Soviet Russia, Sartre argues:
. . . NOlhing can be produced anywhere without provoking. everywhere, at a distance
and without any preexisting practical relationship, an Internal modification of all
human faclS (of the organie and constituting practice of these facts to the practico-
inert)....14
This production depends on tbe intervention of an external Other-bere
Stalin-so that thE~ synthesis that the Other imposes passively is in turn integrated
actively by those whom the Other-Stalin-acted upon:
... The creation, through coercive force aOO through all fonna of work, of a
sovereign unity, that is of an institutional and practical relationahip of the sovereign
to the practica.1 tield. transfonns the context of his life for each person in the spatio-
temporal detennination of the sacrosanct tield of the sovereign Other, and,
simuhaneously, constitutes the field of the individualand of the sub-group al virtually
coinciding with the field of sovereignty (in that each person il himself and in that he
is the Other, that ia Stalin, mysti fying unity situated at the point of infinity of an
serialilies; hut this dialectic cannot be developed here, it would take us too far
afield)... .15
But in fact Sartre does suggests how that dialectic might be developed,
when. two pages later, he also writes, of the wages of an individual worker, that
... the relationship between his standard of living and thai ofthe social categories
immediately above and below hiln defines for hiln al the same time the real
relationship of his obJective existence to that of others....16
14CRD 11, 257. CDR 11, 247.
16CRD 11, 312. CDR 11,301.
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In tbis example tbe Otbert here designated by a nominalized pronoUDt is a
source of oppression external to the group, into which, at the same timet the
Other is incorporated as othert here designated as an uncapitalized object.
B. Qualifying an 'other' subject: otherness as object.
The preceding analysis has created a dilemma, whieh Sartre acknowledges.
Either his analysis of a specific case, here Stalints ereation of Soviet Russiat
constitutes an idealism of the specifie cireumstances, whicb of course is
untenable in a materialist ontology; or, more modestly, Sartre's analysis outlines
a materialist epistemology, whieh is relativistie and not an ontology at all. Sartre
insists that he has escaped bolb horns of this dilemma. Sartre claims to escape
phenomenological idealism because his analysis is grounded in specific cases of
human experience. He also claims to escape epistemological relativism, because
of the ". . . praet;cal reality of each human action escaping the other by
prineiple. . . . .. 17 But Sartre's characterization of otherness (uncapitalized)
then presents a further eontradietion: ". . . the irreducibility of Being to the
known-being as object of knowledge temporalizing itself at the interior of a
more vast social milieu. . . ." 18 Sartre aeknowledges this contradiction; it is
endless.
This eonstant eontradietion between a systematically elusive Other and
other-subject and object-is exemplified in Sartre's own Iinguistie praxis, even
as he describes it. If Beingt as the Othert is manifest as objective reality in the
forms of words through which it is eommunicated, then the historical process
through which the forms of words came to ineamate heing is neglected; andt
with them, individual praxis as weil. But ift in individual aets of speaking and
writingt one incamates and fixes the Other in oneself as forms of wordst then
the verbal institution remains as an unstable residue of a historical process.
Sartre's own use of language thus exemplifies the unending dialecticjust
described. Words-the verbal institution-remain as the serialized third t or other
to the speakers or writers who use thema Sometimes the othemess of words is
blataot, as Sartre suggests in characterizing the writing of officially approved
I7CRD 11, 313. CDR 11, 303.
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Soviet authors whose use of language most follow the Party and whose success
is .. the ;ncarnated triumph of praxis-process. ,,19 But the othemess of words
is a more general eondition of using them, as Sartre also writes of "humanist
realism":
This use of language, we know it: it is oun, it is that of all dialecticians and
from &hat fact it presentl no danger if one lees there only a collection of rapid and
imagistic loeutioßl which Aves time and which cancel themselvel in the very act of
comprehension. . . . -humanist rcalism - (that idealism of the human) is translated
by image. which make of praxi.-proces. as human realily the IUbltance of particular
aCIl and loeal eventl.~
This passage restates Sartre's dilemma: ifBeing, as the Other, is manifest
as objective reality in the forms of words through whieh it is eommunicated,
then the historical process through whieh the form of words came to incamate
heing is neglected, and, with it, individual praxis. Yet it is impossible to engage
in individual aels of speaking and writing-in praxis-without fixing or
transfixing the forms of words as praetico-inert. Then individual human
eonsciousness, with ils eomprehension of words as meant, both is, and is not,
necessary to human communication.
Tbe materiality of praxis is eontextual and perpetually unstable, and this
dialectie is exemplified by Sartre's oWD praxis in Cr;l;que 11, as we have just
seen. It is impossible to engage in aels of speaking and writing-in linguistie
praxis-without transfixing them as objecls, praetieo-inert, dead matter, resisting
our understanding. Yet Sartre also offers eoneomitantly a eoneeption of genuine
interpersonal eommunication or "eomprehension," a kind of understanding
something like "Verstehen" and "Einfiihling," as in the relationship among
members of the groups temporarily fused or pledged. Comprehension is the
material of the soeial world ofhu~ speech, ineamate in the vocal or written
deed.
Thus eomprehension, whieh Sartre elsewhere eharaeterized
psyehologically, here becomes social at the same time; for Sartre embraces the
eontradietion as a dialectical movement. The dialectical movement between a
19CRD 11, 315. CDR 11,305.
'1D1bid.
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nominalized extemal Other aod othemess is incamate in individual praxis, as in
Sartre's own uses of the (uncapitalized) "other":
... Hi.tory makel of man Ibe intelli,ible non-elsential. Man i. ncver eucntial
(except in Ibe pa.O. He ia in himself belng-olher (becaulC he makel himaelf
interiorization of the world) but thil being-olher doe. not prcauPPOIO that there il a
heing-sel!blocked from below. The bein'-lClf il limply the repetition of the beinI·
other. Thil i. the dialectical movemcnt of comprehenaion....21
Comprehension, individual and social, is dialectical in the materiality of
tbe word, for as Sartre had written earlier in Crilique 11:
. . . 7he words are Ihe thing: in the ablCnce of &beir objcct, &bey deltroy it in making
themaelve. pa.. for it; in ita prelCßCe, &bey bind to ita phy.ica' bei.., tike real
qualitiel (and, be.idel, Ihese are real quaiitiel)... .'Zl
The contradiction presented by tbese inert words poses itself against
comprehension, which in turn incorporates another contradictioß, as we have
seen, ceaselessly.
In defiance of an objectification of the word, in dialectical comprehension,
Sartre's subject continues to speak. Doomed, the speaker falls back, ceaselessly,
into the practico-inert of forms of words already uttered. In Cr;lique II Sartre
offers no recourse to the divided speaker. In L 'Idiol 111, more tban a decade
later, he does suggest that the production of a divided writer, Flaubert, does
offer that recourse.
Ill. Sartre's materialist linguistic phenomenology in L'ldlot 111.
Sartre begins L 'Idiot III by proposing that two contradictory interpretations
have been given of Gustave Flaubert's work. The first characterizes his
achievement as a neurotic defensive strategy to escape the reality of his family
situation, extensively discussed in tbe preceding volumes. Sartre calls tbis the
subjective neurosis. The second interpretation makes of Flaubert's subjective
21CRD 11, 455-456. COR 11, 45 I.
22CRD 11, 376. CDR U, 367-368.
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neurosis a positive solution to changes in the class structure after about 1850.
Art had previously been created by writers who stood outside the class structure,
intellectually superior to the aristocrats upon whom they depended for patronage;
but the artist of 1850 was economically bourgeois and had to live like one.
Sartre calls this situation the objective neurosis, the resuIt of a conflict of
individual subjectivity with the objective mind, which is none other than Culture
as practico-inert. Literature incamates it. Literary work is praxis-transcending
the "verbal recipes" which are cultural concretions, imposed by the dominant
class. It is these verbalized systems of values and ideologies that stay in the
mind or at least in memory, for words are matter. Literary work struggles to
transcend the material inertia of the objective mind, which just is these
verbalized ideologies; and literature is a work of material production enclosed
in written language. The principle of writing is dual, embracing both the writer
and the reader, and signs have no other function than "to guide the process of
transcendence"23 oftheir very materiality. Sartre's argument in the early part
of L 'Idiot 11I leads me to three conclusions in applying to Sartre's work on
Flaubert the conception of language as material that Sartre outlined in Critique
11.
A. As Sartre had written in Critique 11, language is concrete relation to
context-that is, to social context. 24 As he extended the argument in L 'Idiot
111, the objective mind exists only through human, and, more specifically,
individual activity. Bach reader, each generation, makes a particular synthesis,
altering the perimeters (and parameters) of totality.2S Language creates heing,
but it creates being historically, not timelessly. Flaubert's own synthesis was a
response to a historical demand.
B. As Sartre had also written in Critique 11, the word is a serialized
third-that is an outsider, an uninvolved observer of the social relations speakers
and writers engage it in transacting.26 Extending the argument in L 'Idiot 111,
ZJL 'Idio' 111, 4"7-48.
24CRD 11, 434. CDR 11, 426.
~L'JdiolllJ, 50.
26CRD 11, 434. CDR 11, 426.
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Sartre wrote that the objective mind, which is culture incamate in language, is
outside thought, in books, the books of others. What makes the objective mind
other is that it is the material vestige of the pasl. Because it is outside individual
thought, the objective mind is a social object, incamate in books and in that
sense collective, yet individuallyand uniquely interpreted by each reader. The
objective mind breaks human reciprocity by Iimiting our comprehension to what
it obliges us to read.27 For Sartre Flaubert, as a bourgeois creation of bis age,
read differently.
c. As Sartre had written in Critique 11 as weil, language is institution.28
In l'ldiot III the institution is none other than the objective mind, materialized
as forms of words. But the objective mind is a ~lIectioD of contradictory
cultural ideologies ofdifferent historieal periods converging simultaneously upon
the reader, who perceives these contradictions uniquely as a demand somehow
to reconcile, or Wtotalizew them. The institutionscreated by the written word are
perpetually destabilized in new readings impossible to their original authors, who
could not perceive the contradictions between their work and others they neither
knew nor read. Sartre says that the objective mind (defined in writing) is the
sum of works published at a time, together with all the totalizations of them
effected by the contemporary reader, who often perceives their contradictions
as an "explosion. "29 The objective mind teils us, in contradictory fashion, that
we are what we have to do.30 Thus the verbal institution created by writing
is recreated by new reading and writing, as by Flaubert.
In L 'Idiot III Sartre proposes that a vocation to write is a call to affirm
literature ["la chose litteraire"] through a new totalization which, without the
least aesthetic commentary, defines society, the public, and the place of the
weiter in social totality.31 Flaubert's writing effected such totalization. Yet he
21L'ldiOI 111, 55.
2&CRD 11, 434. CDR 11, 426.
29L'Idiot 111, 57.
JOL'ldiotlll, 59.
31L'Idiot 111, 65.
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also Iived in a soeial totality that ereated an objective neurosis that became art
neurosis. He was unhappily bourgeois in the passing of an eighteenth-eentury
elass strueture tbat bad made of writing a work apart, and ofthe writer a elass
apart. The literary situation Flaubert faced eonflieted with the imperatives for
totalization that, as an aspiring writer, Flaubert pereeived in the finished works
that preceded hirn. His situation, then, became absurd.
Flaubert not only believed in imitating a schizophrenie attitude toward his
own bourgeois economie and social position, but lived that doubling. He had to
invent unreality as literary material, because it was bis material reality as a
member of a elass. He negated, produeed second-order images of the real, and
was distaneed from bis subject, and tbis attitude toward bis material was a
matter not only aesthetie but also ethical. He was obliged so to live and write,
because, for Sartre, "to negate oneself in playing a role is: in some sense, to
deserve to ereate...32 Thus Flaubert's transformation of the material that is
language is also an individual aet of transeendingthe material eircumstances of
his elass. 33
SUNY COLLEGE AT NEW PALTZ
32L 'Idiot 111, 60.
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33 Parts of this paper were given to the Sartre Circle of the American Philosophical Association
Eastem Division in December, 1987; to a meeting of the Sartre Society of North America in
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